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ABSTRACTS
all. It appears illogical to allow tort actions between certain mem-
bers of the family but not others.
This brings us to the discussion of the principal case. In New
York, a parent may not maintain a tort action against an unemanci-
pated child. Terwilliger v. Terwilliger, 201 Misc. 453, 106 N.Y.S.2d
481 (1951). However, New York courts do permit such actions by a
minor against his unemancipated brother. Rozell v. Rozell, 281 N.Y.
106, 22 N.E.2d 254 (1939). In the principal case, the father insti-
tuted an action for loss of services and expenses necessarily incurred
as a result of the accident. The New York court allowed recovery,
relying heavily upon the fact that since the minor son could recover
damages and future medical expenses from his minor unemancipated
brother, it would result in very little additional family discord to allow
the father to recover also. The conclusion of the court has merit and
should not be criticized, as it has a controlling precedent (regarding
the rights of unemancipated siblings to sue each other) and such
precedents should be given due respect. Talbot v. Riggs, 287 Mass.
144, 191 N.E. 360 (1934). In the absence of such precedent, which
is the situation in the majority of jurisdictions, including West Vir-
ginia, it is the opinion of the writer that actions between unemanci-
pated siblings should be denied applying the same reasoning here-
tofore given for allowing immunity between other members of the
family.
It is asserted that tort actions between family members might
well result in many cases in family discord and dissension, and there
is ever present the imminent danger of fraud and collusion. To al-
low this type of action would result in the jury members' knowledge
of the defendant's coverage by insurance, due to their reasoning that
this is probably the only explanation of why family members would
be suing each other. It would thus seem that tort actions between




LANDLORD AND TENANT-PEBPET~rrIE5S-LEAsEHOLD EsTATE.-
Lease specified that it should be indefinite and terminated only by
tenants inability to pay the monthly rental or his decision to move
his business to another location. Tenant agreed and did build build-
ing on the property as well as agreeing to keep premises insured.
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P, as lessor, notified the tenant to vacate. The tenant declined to va-
cate and in due time the action was instituted. P contended that the
duration of the lease being indefinite violates the rule against per-
petuities. The lower court adjudged that the lease created a valid
freehold estate approximating a tenancy for life. From an adverse
ruling P appealed. Held, at common law a lease to be held at the
will of the lessee is also held at the will of the lessor. However,
when a lessee has a present subsisting interest based on adequate
consideration, the common law rule does not apply and the estate is
not a mere tenancy at will, but a freehold estate approximating a
tenancy for life. The court further held that the lease is not other-
wise invalid because the duration is indefinite, and that the lease
does not violate the rule against perpetuities. Conley v. Gaylock,
108 S.E.2d 675 (W. Va. 1959).
At common law a lease to be held at the will of the lessee, was
also to be held at the will of the lessor and could be terminated by
either. Angel v. Black Band Consol. Coal Co., 96 W. Va. 47, 122
S.E. 274 (1924); Eclipse Oil Co. v. South Penn Oil Co., 47 W.Va. 84,
84 S.E. 923 (1899). However an exception has been recognized
when the lessee has a present interest in leased property based on
adequate consideration, whereby it is held that the lease is at the will
of the lessee only. Lovett v. Eastern Oil Co., 68 W.Va. 667, 70 S.E.
707 (1911). For a collection of cases see, Annot., 137 A.L.R. 362
(1942).
Under the rule pronounced by the court in the principal case it
appears that a just result was reached, but it also appears that the
character of the lease was changed by calling it a freehold interest
approximating a life estate, although the court was no doubt accord-
ed that right by the precedent of Newsom v. Meade, 102 W.Va. 489,
135 S.E. 604 (1926).
Recognizing that the lease amounted to more than a tenancy at
will it remains that the intention of the parties in making the lease
was not to create a tenancy for life but was to create an interest in
the lessee, terminable only at the option of the lessee or on stated
contingencies. If the lease is called a life estate, then on the death
of the lessee, the lease would terminate. In calling the lease a life
estate the court is adding a contingency not stipulated by the parties,
namely, that the lease will terminate upon the lessees' death. Also,
in designating the leasehold estate as a freehold interest the case pre-
sents a questionable issue in that a leasehold estate is commonly
designated as a non-freehold interest. Thus it would seem that the
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true spirit of the lease would most aptly be reached by designating
it so as not to confer upon the lessor the right to terminate the lease
until the happening of the stated contingencies.
H. S. S., Jr.
WILS-CONSTRUcON-INTENT OF TESTATOR PARAmouNT Aim.-
Residuary clause in testator's will devised the residue of his estate to
three named sisters, with a period following the last sister's name,
followed by the language: "or to those who reside at our homeplace,
Glenwood, at the time of my death." The sisters pre-deceased the
testator and D, testators brother, was living at the homeplace at the
time of testator's death. D contends that the intention of the test-
ator was for the residue of his estate to devolve upon anyone resid-
ing at the homeplace at the time of decedent's death. From an ad-
verse judgment D appealed. Held, as the sisters predeceased the
testator, the devise lapsed and his residuary estate descended by op-
eration of law to his heirs, the Ps. The court adjudged the intent of
the testator to be to provide solely for the sisters living at the home-
place at his death and not to operate for the benefit of any other
person. Entwistle v. Covington, 108 S.E.2d 603 (N.C. 1959).
The holding of the principal case represents the effort of courts
to adopt constructions which tend to a final disposition of property.
This tendency is explained by the general rule that intestacy is not to
be favored. National Bank v. Wehrle, 124 W.Va. 268, 20 S.E.2d 112
(1942).
The general rule in construing wills is to regard the intention
of the testator as the pole star to guide and govern the court and that
intention must be given effect, unless it violates some positive rule of
law or public policy. Weiss v. Soto, 142 W.Va. 788, 98 S.E.2d 727
(1957); Goetz v. Old Nat'l Bank, 140 W.Va. 422, 84 S.E.2d 759
(1954). In order to effectuate the testator's intention, it is permiss-
ible for the court to transfer words or phrases or to disregard or
supply punctuation, as was done in the instant case in holding that
only those sisters living at the homeplace at T's death could take.
Bear v. Pitzer, 131 W.Va. 374,47 S.E.2d 839 (1948). In construing a
will, the intention may be ascertained from the words used by the
testator, considered in the light of the language of the entire will and
the circumstances existing at the time the will was made. Young v.
Lewis, 138 W.Va. 425, 76 S.E.2d 276 (1953); Ball v. Ball, 136 W.Va.
852, 69 S.E.2d 55 (1952).
H. S. S., Jr.
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EvmcE-ImEAaaMxNT OF WrrNESSES BY EXPERT OPINION-
PROVINCE OF JTray.-A witness, known to be a heroin addict for five
years, testified that the defendant sold narcotics to him. He also
claimed that he had not taken drugs for four months prior to the
trial. A doctor, called as a witness for D, testified that heroin ad-
dicts, being pathological liars, are unworthy of belief. Held, that
the expert testimony of the doctor was inadmissible in the absence
of clear and convincing evidence that this was the concensus of
medical and scientific opinion, and that the credibility of witnesses'
testimony was the province of the jury. People v. Williams, 187
N.Y.S.2d 750, 159 N.E.2d 549 (1959).
The New York court squarely faced the question "whether a
doctor may testify that narcotic addicts are unworthy of belief in the
sense that they are, in the words of appellate counsel, pathological
liars." The court recognized "considerable difficulty" in resolving
this question, but after deliberation concluded that expert testimony
is inadmissible to establish that narcotic addicts are unworthy of
belief, in the absence of a clear showing that such is the concensus
of medical and scientific opinion. The authorities are not in agree-
ment on the question. McMormNcx, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF
EVnDENCE § 45 (1954). Such testimony is generally excluded on the
ground that medical opinion is not conclusive that narcotic addiction
affects the capacity to tell the truth. Weaver v. United States, 111
F.2d 603, 606 (8th Cir. 1940). For a scholarly review of materials
on this question, see Kelly v. Maryland Cas. Co., 45 F2d 782 (W.D.
Va. 1929).
To the effect that the drug habit may cause a "diseased impair-
ment of the testimonial powers," and that evidence thereon should
be received, see 3 WIGMoRE, EvmENCE § 934 (3d ed. 1940). No
West Virginia decision on this immediate question is found.
H. S. S., Jr.
EsTATE TAx-ExEcuTroRs AND ADMINISTRAToms-NOT BoUND TO
PLEAD STATUTE OF LnnTATION.-Executors claimed as deductions
from the gross estate of the deceased, amounts paid to creditors
which were barred by the statute of limitations. Under Pennsyl-
vania law, an executor is not bound to plead the statute of limitations
if he is satisfied the claim is honest. However a creditor, legatee,
or other person interested in an estate, is allowed the right to inter-
pose the statute of limitations. Tax commissioner invoked the
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statute of limitations in order to preserve the size of the estate for
estate tax purposes. The Tax Court ruled in favor of the commis-
sioner. Held, the INramwAL BvENuE CoDE provides that the net
estate for estate tax purposes is determined by deducting from the
gross estate such claims as are allowed by the laws of the jurisdic-
tion. As creditors or legatees are permitted to raise the bar of the
statute in order to protect their interests or distributive shares, there
is no rationale that would justify denying the same to the federal
government in its efforts to collect its estate taxes. Commissioner v.
Wolf, 264 F.2d 82 (3d Cir. 1959).
In West Virginia, "No claim barred by any statute of limitations
shall be allowed by a commissioner against the estate of a decedent."
W.V, CoDE ch. 44, art. 2, § 12 (Michie, 1955). Under West Vir-
ginia law a personal representative is personally liable for failure to
plead bar of a statute of limitations against a claim asserted against
an estate."... if any personal representative ... pay any debt the
recovery of which could be prevented by reason of... or lapse of
time... which he knows, or by the exercise of due dillegence could
ascertain, the facts by which the same could be prevented, no credit
shall be allowed him therefor." W.VA. CoDE ch. 44, art. 4, § 13
(Michie, 1955).
Application of the above provisions to the principal case discloses
that the West Virginia law is contra to that of Pennsylvania and the
problem presented in the principal case would not arise in West
Virginia by virtue of the fact that debts barred by a lapse of time
could not be paid to secure a deduction for estate tax purposes. West
Virginia, as does Pennsylvania, recognizes the right of creditors to
appear before the commisssioner and contest the claims of each
other. Brewer v. Hutton, 45 W. Va. 106, 30 S.E. 81 (1898).
H. S. S., Jr.
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